Antecedente. Se considera «eutanasia» al acto de acabar con la vida del paciente a petición expresa de él, para terminar el sufrimiento propio de alguna enfermedad sin perspectiva de cura. Objetivo. Evaluar los conocimientos y la percepción sobre la eutanasia en estudiantes y profesionales de medicina, demostrando los conocimientos y clasificando la percepción sobre la eutanasia. Metodología. Estudio clínico-epidemiológico, observacional, cualitativo-cuantitativo, de corte transversal y con muestreo no probabilístico por conveniencia, en los estudiantes y profesionales de medicina de un hospital (...) en Venezuela. Resultados. La muestra estudiada tuvo una distribución según grado de instrucción: 64.85% de estudiantes, 19.33% de residentes y 15.82% de especialistas. Presentaron un grado de conocimiento medio, distribuido en 84.4% de especialistas, 77.3% de residentes y 80.5% de estudiantes (p 0.051). De acuerdo con los grados de conocimiento y el apoyo a la eutanasia, el 76.18% tiene un grado medio de conocimientos (p 0.0002). Conclusión. Se demostró que existe un grado medio de conocimiento, en particular en la población estudiantil. La eutanasia no fue percibida de manera negativa, demostrando una alta significancia en la atención a las implicaciones éticas que rodean este concepto. (shrink)

Con este trabajo se pretende justificar que la consecución de la explicación-relación de fenómenos psicológicos trasciende del tipo de diseño que se aplique para la obtención de datos de interés investigador. De forma que se hace explícito cómo los distintos diseños explicativos, los grupales y los de sujeto único, implican formas distintas para llevar a efecto las acciones comparativas pero igual de rigurosas. Asimismo, se intenta demostrar que no tiene demasiado sentido entender que algunos de ellos son mejores que otros, (...) sino que para su elección debe imperar el criterio de adecuación estructural y analítica a los fenómenos naturales que se pretenden constreñir. Para ello, tras una breve introducción se hace una exposición de ideas acerca del estado actual de la metodología en Psicología para finalmente llegar a una reconceptualización de los diseños de sujeto único. Reconceptualización ésta, llevada a cabo desde lo puramente estructural y no sólo desde lo absolutamente estadístico. (shrink)

"Knowing how we know" is the subject of this book. Its authors present a new view of cognition that has important social and ethical implications, for, they assert, the only world we humans can have is the one we create together through the actions of our coexistence. Written for a general audience as well as for students, scholars, and scientists and abundantly illustrated with examples from biology, linguistics, and new social and cultural phenomena, this revised edition includes a new afterword (...) by Dr. Varela, in which he discusses the effect the book has had in the years since its first publication. (shrink)

We propose that to understand the biological and neurophysiological processes that give rise to human mental phenomena it is necessary to consider them as behavioral relational phenomena. In particular, we propose that: a) these phenomena take place in the relational manner of living that human language constitutes, and b) that they arise as recursive operations in such behavioral domain. Accordingly, we maintain that these phenomena do not take place in the brain, nor are they the result of a unique operation (...) of a human brain, but arise with the participation of the brain as it generates the behavioral relational dynamics that constitutes language. (shrink)

José Jorge Mendoza argues that the difficulty with resolving the issue of immigration is primarily a conflict over competing moral and political principles and is, at its core, a problem of philosophy. This book brings into dialogue various contemporary philosophical texts that deal with immigration to provide some normative guidance to immigration policy and reform.

In debating the ethics of immigration, philosophers have focused much of their attention on determining whether a political community ought to have the discretionary right to control immigration. They have not, however, given the same amount of consideration to determining whether there are any ethical limits on how a political community enforces its immigration policy. This article, therefore, offers a different approach to immigration justice. It presents a case against legitimate states having discretionary control over immigration by showing both how (...) ethical limits on enforcement circumscribe the options legitimate states have in determining their immigration policy and how all immigrants (including undocumented immigrants) are entitled to certain protections against a state’s enforcement apparatus. (shrink)

Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy, and the distinction between original agency and enhanced agency, we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, (...) since it is highly unlikely that e.g. bacteria have any first-person perspective. Using this model, we review and assess recent proposals on the nature of agency from cognitive science, and neuroscience, and draw conclusions on how to incorporate aspects of them within a synthetic cognitive-semiotic framework. (shrink)

In this essay, I reflect on the implications of intellectual virtues in scientific endeavor. To this end, I first offer a depiction of scientific endeavor by resorting to the notion of academic attitude, which involves aspects concerning the generation and possession of knowledge. Although there are differences between these activities, they have in common the engagement of diverse intellectual agents (scientists). In this sense, I analyze how intellectual virtues are linked to 1) scientific research tasks, such as theory appraisal, and (...) 2) those tasks of vigilance and intervention in the uses of scientific knowledge. I conclude that intellectual virtues play a leading role in achieving higher quality scientific research and adequate foresight on the uses and impacts of scientific findings. In this order of ideas, I propose an agenda for further inquiries on these matters, highlighting the relevance of reflecting and empirically researching the relationship between intellectual virtues and science, as well as cultivating intellectual virtues in various stages of scientific training. (shrink)

This chapter looks at the history of US citizenship and immigration law and argues that denying admission or citizenship status to certain groups of people is closely correlated to a denial of whiteness. On this account whiteness is not a fixed or natural concept, but instead is a social construction whose composition changes throughout time and place. Understanding whiteness in this way allows one to see how white supremacy is not limited merely to instances of racism or ethnocentrism, but can (...) also include instances of xenophobia. On this account, whiteness is more analogous to a braid of three interwoven strands: the racial strand (e.g., science, biology, or phenotypes), the ethnic strand (e.g., culture, customs, or heritage), and the national strand (e.g., territory, sovereignty, and citizenship). In emphasizing one or a combination of these strands, whiteness can be granted to social groups that previously were denied full white status, while at the same time it can be rescinded from groups that at different times and different places might have been considered (if only provisionally) white. Understanding whiteness in this way is important for dealing with issues of immigration and citizenship because it lets us see how nationality and xenophobia play a role in the construction of whiteness and thereby how terms like illegal help to reify the status of certain persons, including natural born citizens, as perpetual foreigners (i.e., non-whites). (shrink)

David Miller’s defense of a state’s presumptive right to exclude non-refugee immigrants rests on two key distinctions. The first is that immigration controls are “preventative” and not “coercive.” In other words, when a state enforces its immigration policy it does not coerce noncitizens into doing something as much as it prevents them from doing a very specific thing (e.g., not entering or remaining within the state), while leaving other options open. Second, he makes a distinction between “denying” people their human (...) rights and “deterring” people from exercising their human rights. On this view, when those assigned to protect or fulfil human rights are also tasked with performing immigration enforcement duties, undocumented immigrants are not being denied their human rights, even when this deters them from exercising those rights. In this article, I argue that Miller’s two distinctions have an implication that he might not have foreseen. Specifically, I argue that these distinctions provide ideological cover for what has come to be known as “crimmigration” and that we have strong reasons for wanting our theory of immigration justice to reject this, even when doing so leaves open the possibility for an indirect open-borders argument. (shrink)

Philosophers have assumed that as long as discriminatory admission and exclusion policies are off the table, it is possible for one to adopt a restrictionist position on the issue of immigration without having to worry that this position might entail discriminatory outcomes. The problem with this assumption emerges, however,when two important points are taken into consideration. First, immigration controls are not simply discriminatory because they are based on racist or ethnocentric attitudes and beliefs, but can themselves also be the source (...) of social and civic ostracism. Second, by focusing so much on questions of admission and exclusion, philosophers have tended to overlook the discriminatory potential of immigration enforcement mechanisms. In this essay, I make the case that philosophers who deal with the issue of immigration cannot dispense with the potential for discrimination in a state's enforcement mechanism as easily as they have with the potential for discrimination in a state’s admission and exclusions criteria. In addition, I put forth the positive claim that the way to combat this potential for discrimination (e.g., xenophobia) must begin with a defense of, and advocacy for, immigrant rights. (shrink)

El presente artículo defiende que las nociones de epojé y de modificación de neutralidad, a pesar de su aparente semejanza, deben mantenerse radicalmente diferenciadas. La razón de fondo es que ambas surgen en el seno de operaciones de la conciencia que son metodológica y jerárquicamente distintas. Para tal efecto, haré una descripción de sus funciones y estructura, de modo que se hagan visibles tanto sus respectivas esferas de aplicación como el alcance operativo de sus procedimientos.

This essay argues that we should find Crimmigration, which is the collapsing of immigration law with criminal law, morally problematic for three reasons. First, it denies those who are facing criminal penalties important constitutional protections. Second, it doubly punishes those who have already served their criminal sentence with an added punishment that should be considered cruel and unusual (i.e., indefinite imprisonment or exile). Third, when the tactics aimed at protecting and serving local communities get usurped by the federal government for (...) immigration enforcement purposes, they often undermine these original aims or get used in ways that conflict with the U.S. Constitution. These concerns should prompt us therefore either to reject the government’s plenary power over immigration or require the federal government to be more consistent about maintaining the separation between criminal law and immigration law. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that even when they appear to help, restrictions on migration are usually only an impediment, not an aid, to cosmopolitan justice. Even though some egalitarian cosmopolitans are well intentioned in their support of migration restrictions, I argue that migration restrictions are (i) not truly cosmopolitan and (ii) will not have the kinds of consequences they expect. My argument in defense of this claim begins, in section 1, by outlining a defense of migration restrictions based on (...) egalitarian cosmopolitan grounds. Then in sections two and three, I reply to the harms this position associates with open borders and provide some reasons as to why restrictions on migration are incompatible with cosmopolitan justice. (shrink)

¿Cómo se rinde homenaje a un filósofo que a lo largo de su vida conjugó la academia y la filosofía con el rol de intelectual público? En el caso de Giannini, la respuesta es clara: estimulando la circulación de sus ideas, que junto a su vasta obra filosófica lograron configurar un discurso complejo y agudo acerca del Chile del último siglo. Y es precisamente parte de esa riqueza la que intentamos capturar en este libro que inaugura la colección Maestros y (...) maestras de la Chile, destinada a difundir el legado intelectual de quienes, como Humberto Giannini, no solo formaron a generaciones de jóvenes sino que a la vez aportaron a su disciplina y a la densificación de los discursos, asumiendo con propiedad que ‘lo público’ es inherente al quehacer de la Universidad de Chile. (shrink)

Context: At the conference “The Ethical Meaning of Francisco Varela’s Thought,” which took place on 28 May 2011 in Sassari, Italy, Humberto Maturana, Michel Bitbol, and Pier Luigi Luisi participated in two discussions. Purpose: In this edited transcription of the discussions, the participants talk about several aspects of autopoiesis, the observer, ontology, making distinctions and distinguishing different domains, perception and illusion, and transcendence. Results: The discussions shed light on how constructivist concepts are perceived by individual authors. Concepts such as (...) “transcendence” and “objectivity” are understood in different ways. Constructivist content: The concepts discussed are highly relevant for constructivist approaches. (shrink)

The article examines the theories of decolonization that have originated in the north of the Americas and Oceania and Latin America. It compares settler colonial theories developed by Australian historians Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini with the theory of the coloniality of power of the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano. The author argues that Wolfe’s and Veracini’s theory of settler colonialism creates a conceptual distancing from what they call exploitation colonialism that is not only theoretically unsound, but also historically inaccurate. The (...) land/labor binary that they build in their theory of settler colonialism holds up only if it excludes Latin America from the analysis. This becomes evident in their analyses of the state, race, and miscegenation. Both theories, however, largely ignore gender in the description of colonization, a gap that Latin American decolonial theorists and feminist indigenous theorists of the north must fill. The differences between the theories determines also the ways they imagine decolonization. (shrink)

In this chapter, I outline what philosophers working on the ethics of immigration have had to say with regard to invidious discrimination. In doing so, I look at both instances of direct discrimination, by which I mean discrimination that is explicitly stated in official immigration policy, and indirect discrimination, by which I mean cases where the implementation or enforcement of facially “neutral” policies nonetheless generate invidious forms of discrimination. The end goal of this chapter is not necessarily to take a (...) side, but to outline the terrain and provide the reader with an adequate entryway into these philosophical discussions over discrimination and immigration. (shrink)

The article interrogates transnational feminisms as a concept and as a practice. It frames its analysis using contemporary theories of globalization and the older concept of global sisterhood as a backdrop to the concept of transnational feminism. To assess the practical dimension of transnational feminisms, the analysis focuses on women's rights as a human rights movement and the transnationalization of Latin American feminisms. The article suggests that, although transnational feminisms (particularly feminist postcolonial theories) envision themselves in a new frame and (...) see themselves as committed to intersectional analysis and transversal politics, there are important gaps between the intentions (theory, tactics) and outcomes of their theory and practice. (shrink)

I do not wish to deal with all the domains in which the word time enters as if it were referring to an obvious aspect of the world or worlds that we human live. Indeed, the very fact that time can be made an issue of reflection shows us that what the word time connotes changes with the circumstances in which it is used. This situation alone, however, would not constitute a problem inviting us to enter in deep reflections if (...) we just accepted that the context defined the meaning of the word in each case. But we do not do that, and we ask the question what is time? as if we thought that the word time referred to some independent entity or dimension of nature that could be properly disclosed or described if we tried hard enough, even if we could not the final essence of it. I consider, however, that the question what is time? is adequate because it implies from the start the view that time can be properly treated as some kind of independent entity or dimension of nature. And I consider that such a view is fully inadequate because I think that all that we human beings talk about are relations that arises in our operation in language as a closed domain of recursive consensual coordinations of behaviors. Let me explain what I say with a few words about living, language, and cognition, and then answer the question what distinctions do we make or connote when we talk of time? (shrink)

Background No studies have been conducted in Mexico to ascertain what ethical problems doctors working at hospitals deal with. This article aims to describe the ethical conflicts most commonly identified by Mexican internists and the importance they attribute to each of these conflicts. Methods Voluntary survey to the members of the Internal Medicine Association of Mexico. Results Responses were submitted by 347 internists. Half of those face ethical conflicts almost always or frequently. The most commonplace and relevant conflicts are those (...) resulting from the clinical relationship (communication, confidentiality, informed consent, assessment of mental capacity, decisions involving incapacitated patients, and conflicts with family members), and secondly those problems related with the end of life (palliative care, withholding or withdrawing treatment, and “No CPR orders”). To resolve conflicts they seek support through protocols, Institutional Ethics Committees (IECs), and consultations with colleagues and, occasionally, with bioethics experts. Protocols and IECs are the tools most in demand among them. Conclusions 1) the most frequent and relevant conflicts are those caused by the clinical relationship, above all those due to doctor–patient communication, and secondly those due to problems which arise at the end of life; 2) though nearly all of them have doubts about how to resolve conflicts, the vast majority are satisfied with the way in which they do so; 3) to deal with conflicts, they seek support mainly in protocols, IECs, and consultation with colleagues; and 4) in order to resolve them better, what they most demand are protocols and IECs, but also bioethics consultants. (shrink)

El presente artículo desarrolla un análisis crítico de papel metodológico que desempeña la libre fantasía en Ideas I. Haciendo visible la estrecha relación entre las modalizaciones de conciencia y la estructura noético-noemática de los actos intencionales, se demostrará la necesaria complementariedad de los métodos de las reducciones eidética y fenomenológica para el proyecto de Husserl de una crítica fenomenológica del conocimiento. Con ello se busca poner de relieve que el rendimiento de la fantasía tuvo un impacto metodológico decisivo para la (...) conversión trascendental de la fenomenología. (shrink)

In this article, I broadly sketch out the current philosophical debate over immigration and highlight some of its shortcomings. My contention is that the debate has been too focused on border enforcement and therefore has left untouched one of the more central issue of this debate: what to do with unauthorized immigrants who have already crossed the border and with the “push and pull” factors that have created this situation. After making this point, I turn to the work of Enrique (...) Dussel and argue that his philosophical approach offers some insights that can help overcome these shortcomings. In particular, Dussel’s commitment to a social critique and transformation that begins with the material grievances of the most excluded and oppressed in a community. Under this type of approach, the immigration debate would begin with the grievances of the victims of immigration polices and reform (i.e. unauthorized immigrants) instead of with concerns for how to better enforce borders. Lastly, I point out that this type of approach is consistent with the current Immigrant Rights Movement in the United States. (shrink)

In this chapter I attempt to provide a general overview of the philosophical literature on immigration from both an ethics of immigration and philosophy of race perspective. I then try to make the case that putting these two literatures into conversation would be fruitful. In particular, that it could provide an underappreciated argument for limiting the discretion states are normally thought to enjoy with respect to immigration.

In (Re)Defining Racism, Alberto Urquidez argues that conflicting philosophical accounts over the definition of racism are at bottom linguistic confusions that would benefit from a Wittgensteinian-inspired approach. In this essay, I argue that such an approach would be helpful in disputes over the definition of metaphysically contested concepts, such as “race,” or semantically contested concepts, such as “racialization.” I disagree, however, that such insights would prove helpful or do very little for disputes concerning normatively contested concepts, such as “racism.”.

The answers to these two questions would have been obvious years ago: Human beings, of course, machines are instruments of human design! But now days when we speak so much of progress, science and technology as if progress, science and technology were in themselves values to be venerated, there are many people that think that machines as they become more and more complex and intelligent through human design, may in fact become alive so that they may supplant us as a (...) natural outcome of that very venerated progress and expansion of intelligence. Also many people seems to think that evolution is changing its nature so that technology is becoming the guiding force in the flow of the cosmic change in relation to us. I do not hold this view. I do not look at progress, science or technology as if they were values in themselves, nor do I think that biological or cosmic evolution is changing its nature or character. I think that the question that we human beings must face is that of what do we want to happen to us, not a question of knowledge or progress. The question that we must face is not about the relation of biology with technology, or about the relation between art and technology, nor about the relation between knowledge and reality, nor even about whether or not metadesign shapes our brains. I think that the question that we must face at this moment of our history is about our desires and about whether we want or not to be responsible of our desires. (shrink)

The persistent educational challenges that fractions pose call for developing novel instructional methods to better prepare students for fraction learning. Here, we examined the effects of a 24-session, Cuisenaire rod intervention on a building block for symbolic fraction knowledge, continuous and discrete non-symbolic proportional reasoning, in children who have yet to receive fraction instruction. Participants were 34 second-graders who attended the intervention (intervention group) and 15 children who did not participate in any sessions (control group). As attendance at the intervention (...) sessions was irregular (median = 15.6 sessions, range = 1–24), we specifically examined the effect of the number of sessions completed on their non-symbolic proportional reasoning. Our results showed that children who attended a larger number of sessions increased their ability to compare non-symbolic continuous proportions. However, contrary to our expectations, they also decreased their ability to compare misleading discretized proportions. In contrast, children in the Control group did not show any change in their performance. These results provide further evidence on the malleability of non-symbolic continuous proportional reasoning and highlight the rigidity of counting knowledge interference on discrete proportional reasoning. (shrink)

Given the oncoming demographic changes—which are primarily driven by the growth in the Latinx community—the United States is predicted to become a minority-majority country by around 2050. This seems to suggest that electoral strategies that employ “dog-whistle” politics are destined for the dust-bin of history. Following the work of critical race theorists, such as Ian Haney-Lopez and Derrick Bell, I want to suggest that pronouncing the inevitable demise of dog-whistle politics is premature. This is because there are reasons to suspect (...) that certain segments of the Latinx community—much like the Southern and Eastern Europeans in the early part of 20th Century—might be co-opted into American whiteness. (shrink)

Our purpose in this essay is to introduce new concepts in a wide and recursive view of the systemic consequences of the following biological facts that I and we have presented that can be resumed as: that as living systems we human beings are molecular autopoietic system; that living systems live only as long as they find themselves in a medium that provides them with all the conditions that make the realization of their living possible, that is, in the continuous (...) conservation of their relation of adaptation to the circumstances in which they find themselves; that as a living system exists only in a relation of adaptation with the medium that operates as its ecological niche, its reproduction necessarily occurs as a process of systemic duplication or multiplication of the ecological organism-niche unity that it integrates; that the worlds of doings that we generate as languaging beings in our conversations, explanations, reflections and theories are part of our ecological niche; and that we human beings as living beings that exist in languaging, are biological–cultural beings in which our cultural and our biological manners of existences can be distinguished but cannot be separated. Of the systemic consequences of these biological facts that we consider in this essay, we wish to mention two as the principal: that the diversification of manners of living produced in biological evolution is the result of differential survival in a changing medium through the conservation of adaptation, and not through competitive survival of the best; and that we in our living as languaging human beings are the epistemological fundament of all that we do and know as such. (shrink)

El presente trabajo desarrolla una breve introducción a la ausencia u obscurecimiento de la doctrina epistémica de Francisco Suárez bajo una triple restricción especulativa: 1. se referirá exclusivamente a las investigaciones contemporáneas sobre el pensamiento de Suárez, donde se observarían sugerencias y consideraciones generales sobre su epistemología; 2. a las Disputaciones Metafísicas, y a los filósofos y teólogos allí consignados, y en derredor de ello, a la conflictiva relación doctrinal con Tomás de Aquino y su vinculación con Duns Escoto. A (...) su vez tales consideraciones quedarán expuestas al modo de una pesquisa siempre inconclusa, en la medida en que es imposible dar cuenta de la significativa investigación actual en todos sus matices. (shrink)

Este artículo busca establecer en primer lugar una doble distinción: de un lado, entre fantasía y conciencia de imagen; y, por el otro, entre fantasía y conciencia estética, ambas a partir de los trabajos de Edmund Husserl. Las dos series de distinciones se encuentran ligadas una con otra por el especial estatuto fenomenológico que Husserl concede a la imagen, el cual debe ser también sometido a aclaración. El artículo propone tres conclusiones: que la así llamada “conciencia estética” no es resultado (...) de ninguna “epojé”; que la experiencia de la imagen entremezcla percepción y fantasía; y que esta conciencia estética exige como contrapolo a un sujeto que habita en la irrealidad del “como si”. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone explorar la noción de mundo ficcional desde la filosofía de Edmund Husserl, destacando la potencialidad de la fenomenología para los campos de la estética y la teoría de la ficción. Para ello, partiré de la descripción de las estructuras sobre las que se erige la vivencia ficcional, que aquí será tratada como una vivencia de fantasía. Bajo este enfoque, el análisis muestra primero la correlación entre conciencia de fantasía y mundo de fantasía, pasando a continuación (...) a explicitar las estructuras de cada uno de los polos de experiencia. Para Husserl, esta correlación se sustenta lógicamente en la doctrina del idealismo trascendental y en su concepción del mundo de fantasía como mundo posible. (shrink)

editorial changes not yet reviewed by author Purpose My intent in this essay is to reflect on the history of some biological notions such as autopoiesis, structural coupling, and cognition, that I have developed since the early 1960’s as a result of my work on visual perception and the organization of the living. No doubt I shall repeat things that I have said in other publications (Maturana and Varela 1980 and 1988), and I shall present notions that once they are (...) said appear as obvious truisms. But the reader it is not invited to attend to the truisms, rather he or she is invited to attend to the consequences that they entail for the understanding of biological processes. After all, explanations or demonstrations always become self evident once they are understood and accepted. KEYWORDS Autopoiesis, structural coupling, cognition, explanations, self consciousness, 1. Autopoiesis 1.1 Origins of the notion In November 1960, a first year medical student asked me the question “What began three thousand eight hundred million years ago so that you can say now that living systems began then?” I realized that I could not properly answer that question, so I said “I cannot answer this question now, but if you come back next year I shall propose an answer then.” Thus I accepted the question of the student to be answered later, and as I did so, I accepted also the question for myself. I realized that to answer this question I had to create a living system, either conceptually or practically, because I had to be able to say what kind of systems were living system to be able to say how they began. While in the attempting to answer the dual questions of what kind of systems are living systems, and of how did they begin so that I could now speak of their origin, it became obvious to me that living systems exist as autonomous entities in the form of self contained closed molecular dynamics of self production, open to the flow of molecules through them. Indeed, one can say that living systems arose in the history of the earth in the moment in which some spontaneous networks of molecular autocatalytic processes became closed upon themselves.. (shrink)

The social trust argument asserts that a political community cannot survive without social trust, and that social trust cannot be achieved or maintained without a political community having discretionary control over immigration. Various objections have already been raised against this argument, but because those objections all assume various liberal commitments they leave the heart of the social trust argument untouched. This chapter argues that by looking at the socio-historical circumstances of Latino/as in the United States, an inherent weakness of the (...) social trust argument gets exposed. Giving a political community discretionary control over immigration not only fails to deliver on the promise of social trust, but it actually seems to promote its opposite, social mistrust. This suggests that a far better way of promoting the goal of social trust, and at the same time abating social mistrust, is to actually circumvent a political community’s ability to control immigration by giving priority both to socio-historical circumstances and immigrant rights (at least in a minimalist sense) in determining immigration policy. (shrink)

Der Mensch ist fähig zu erkennen. Diese Fähigkeit setzt allerdings seine bio logische Integrität (Ganzheit, Unversehrtheit) voraus. Der Mensch kann außerdem erkennen, daß er erkennt. Erkennen (Kognition) als basale psychologische und somit biologische Funktion steuert seine Handhabung der Welt, und Wissen gibt seinen Handlungen Sicherheit. Objektives Wissen scheint möglich, und die Welt erscheint dadurch planvoll und vorhersagbar. Und doch ist Wissen als Erfahrung etwas Persönliches und Privates, das nicht übertragen werden kann. Das, was man für übertragbar hält, nämlich objektives Wissen, (...) muß immer durch den Hörer geschaffen werden: Der Hörer versteht nur dann, und objektives Wissen erscheint nur dann übertragbar, wenn der Hörer zu verstehen (vor)bereit(et) ist. Kognition als biologische Funktion besteht darin, daß sich die Antwort auf die Frage Was ist Kognition? aus dem Verständnis des Erkennens bzw. des Erkennenden aufgrund der Fähigkeit des letzteren zu erkennen ergeben muß. Eben darin besteht meme Arbeit. Epistemologie Der zentrale Anspruch der Wissenschaft ist Objektivität: sie [die Wissenschaft] ist bestrebt, mit Hilfe einer wohldefinierten Methodologie Aussagen über die Welt zu machen. Gerade in der Basis dieses Anspruches liegt jedoch ihre Schwäche: die apriorische Annahme, daß objektives Wissen eine Beschreibung dessen darstellt, was man weiß. Eine solche Annahme erfordert die Klärung der Fragen Worin be steht Erkennen bzw. Wissen? und Wie erkennen und wissen wir? Biologie a) Das größte Hindernis für das Verständnis der Organisation des Lebendigen liegt darin, daß es nicht möglich ist, sie durch eine Aufzählung ihrer Eigen schaften zu erklären. Sie muß vielmehr als Einheit verstanden werden. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone explorar la relación entre neutralización y conciencia del ‘como si’ en la fenomenología de Husserl, en particular, a partir de su convergencia en las intuiciones de fantasía. Partiendo de una crítica a una línea de interpretación que, en su intento de aproximarse fenomenológicamente a una «conciencia estética», homologa la modificación de neutralidad con la epojé, el artículo busca exponer la función metodológica que cumplen la modalización de la creencia en el proyecto de Ideas I, así (...) como también resaltar la importancia creciente que la fantasía y la conciencia del ‘como si’ irán adquiriendo en el desarrollo posterior de la fenomenología de Husserl. (shrink)

In 2008 Robert Lovato coined the phrase Juan Crow. Juan Crow is a type of policy or enforcement of immigration laws that discriminate against Latino/as in the United States. This essay looks at the implications this phenomenon has for an ethics of immigration. It argues that Juan Crow, like its predecessor Jim Crow, is not merely a condemnation of federalism, but of any immigration reform that has stricter enforcement as one of its key components. Instead of advocating for increased enforcement, (...) I want to suggest that just immigration reform must adhere to two standards, equality of burdens and universal protections, and that only by doing so can the potential for Juan Crow be adequately avoided. (shrink)

Durante los últimos decenios del siglo XX la filosofía de Francisco Suárez fue considerada parte integrante de un movimiento escolástico comúnmente mencionado como escuela tomista. La perspectiva de abordaje, según el mote impuesto, colocaba la posición especulativa del Dr. Eximio más próxima al dominico Tomás de Aquino de acuerdo con los siguientes matices: a. en el ámbito epistémico la figura del Aquinate eclipsaba ampliamente aquella de Suárez, promoviendo una auténtica desconsideración de sus tesis originales; b. el jesuita español fundaba, igual (...) que Tomás de Aquino, la división de las ciencias especulativas en el acto intelectual de abstracción; c. la diferencia entre ambas concepciones metafísicas no implicaba necesariamente una comprensión epistémica distinta. Ahora bien, contra estas interpretaciones aparece en el siglo XXI otra lectura, donde se acentúa la diferencia decisiva de la filosofía del jesuita del siglo XVI, quien, en letras medievales, escribe y piensa en permanente tensión entre la herencia de la filosofía antigua y medieval por una parte, y una neo-escolástica de aires renacentistas por la otra. De acuerdo con ello, si bien su pensamiento discurre por una tradición aristotelizante del saber, la comprensión de las ciencias se asienta, a diferencia de Tomás de Aquino, en clave objetiva. Sobre esta premisa, el siguiente estudio abordará con exclusividad la originalidad epistémica de Suárez según la división de las ciencias especulativas y reales, mostrando el orden, el principio y las relaciones entre las ciencias física, matemática y metafísica. (shrink)

Since at least the second half of the 19th century, the U.S. federal government has enjoyed “plenary power” over its immigration policy. Plenary power allows the federal government to regulate immigration free of judicial review and thereby, with regard to immigration cases, minimize the Constitutional protections afforded to non-citizens. The justification for granting the U.S federal government such broad powers comes from a certain understanding of sovereignty; one where limiting sovereign authority in cases like immigration could potentially undermine its legitimacy (...) and thereby lead to something like a Hobbesian “state of nature.” One of the potential downsides of allowing the federal government to have such broad powers, however, is the potential to place non-citizens in a situation analogous to what Giorgio Agamben has called the “state of exception.” This situation appears to leave us with the following dichotomy: without something like the plenary power doctrine a political community will end up with a state of nature, but with something like the plenary power doctrine they end up with a state of exception. This essay offers a two-part response to this dilemma. First, it argues that the plenary power doctrine goes against the spirit of the U.S. Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Non-citizens, even undocumented immigrants, are entitled to more Constitutional protections than they currently enjoy. Second, since extending these protections is more consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, I argue that curtailing the federal government’s power over matters of immigration does not undermine its sovereignty, but promotes it. In short, with regard to immigration, it is a false but seductive dichotomy that constitutional democracies must choose between a state of nature and a state of exception. (shrink)

In this article I use the tropes of El Cucuy (the Mexican version of the boogyman), La Llorona (the wailer), and La Migra (the border patrol) to provide the beginnings of an ethical critique of the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the United States.